27.09.2000 - Так начиналась война Осло

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igorp
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Re: 27.09.2000 - Так начиналась война Осло

Postby igorp » 26 Dec 2008, 22:27

После восьми лет скверны, могила Йосефа отремонтирована
07:59 25 Декабря 2008

Image
После восьми лет скверны, могила Йосефа-праведника (Шхем) была отремонтирована в течение прошлой недели, по распоряжению министерства обороны. Вчера ЦАХАЛ допустил на могилу группу евреев, которая провела на месте молитву.

Место захоронения одного из праотцов еврейского народа, Йосефа-праведника, является одной из национальных святынь Израиля, одним из тех мест, которые, согласно свидетельству Торы, праотцы еврейского народа приобрели в вечное пользование у кнаанейских племен, населявших Эрец-Исраэль в древности - наряду с Пещерой Махпела в Хевроне и территорией Старого города в Иерусалиме.

Территория гробницы Йосефа была включена в территорию, остающуюся под контролем Израиля, в рамках соглашения в Осло. Однако во время Второй интифады, в 2000-м году она была оставлена ЦАХАЛом, позорно отступившим перед шхемскими бандитами, захватившими гробницу и осквернившими ее. В ходе отступления, глава правительства и министр обороны Эхуд Барак и начальник генштаба Шауль Мофаз оставили на поле боя истекающего кровью сержанта МАГАВ Мадхата Юсуфа, что вошло в анналы ЦАХАЛа, как одна из позорнейших страниц.

Позже бандиты были выбиты с территории гробницы Йосефа, вблизи которой функционировала также в течение многих лет ешива "Од-Йосеф-хай", под руководством рава ицхака Гинзбурга, но евреям вход на ее территорию оставался запрещен. Гробница оставалась разрушенной и оскверненной.

Несмотря на запрет, евреи продолжали тайком проникать на могилу Йосефа-праведника, проводя на месте молитвы, чтения псалмов и даже церемонии "брит-мила" и бракосочетания. Официальные представители еврейских региональных советов Иудеи и Самарии в течение всех восьми с лишним лет добивались от министерства обороны восстановления гробницы и свободного доступа евреев на ее территорию.

В данный момент гробница отремонтирована, но частично. Глава регионального совета Самарии Гершон Месика отметил позитивный сдвиг, произошедший в отношении израильских властей к одной из святынь еврейского народа, и выразил надежду, что это - лишь первый шаг к полному восстановлению еврейского контроля и возобновлению функционирования на месте ешивы.
Так и остается загадкой, как удaлoсь М.Карпову сoврaть в 3.3 рaзa бoльше чем Бaрaк...
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igorp
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Re: 27.09.2000 - Так начиналась война Осло

Postby igorp » 26 Mar 2009, 23:31

Двунациональное еврейское государство
Отчет Комиссии Т. Ора и проблемы арабского сектора в Израиле
Алек ЭПШТЕЙН (Иерусалим), Григорий МЕЛАМЕДОВ (Москва)

Крах переговоров в Кемп-Дэвиде в июле 2000 года рассматривался многими политическими обозревателями как прелюдия к новому витку эскалации арабо-израильского противостояния. На протяжении двух последующих месяцев Эхуд Барак и Ясер Арафат не встречались между собой. Однако, несмотря на фиаско изнурительных переговоров в Кемп-Дэвиде, американская администрация продолжала инициировать дальнейшие контакты между израильскими и палестинскими лидерами в надежде, что они смогут прийти к соглашению. 25 сентября 2000 г. Э. Барак принял Я. Арафата в своем доме в поселке Кохав-Яир, где живут многие отставные военные; встреча была охарактеризована как «плодотворная». Однако в четверг 28 сентября, после посещения тогдашним лидером оппозиции Ариэлем Шароном Храмовой горы, палестинские руководители приняли решение о начале новой кампании насилия. Палестинские руководители полагали, что уровень деморализации израильского общества достиг критической отметки и что новая волна террора заставит кабинет Э. Барака пойти на дальнейшие значительные уступки в ходе переговоров, согласиться на полное отступление Израиля к границам 1967 года. Палестинские лидеры едва ли представляли себе, что вторая интифада продлится не месяцы, а годы и что их партнерами по переговорам будут не Э. Барак и Б. Клинтон, а А. Шарон и Дж. Буш. События развивались иначе, чем предполагали в тот момент все вовлеченные в конфликт и переговорный процесс стороны.
...
... уже в первый день второй интифады депутат Кнессета Абдул-Малик Дехамше заявил: «Мы приложим все усилия для того, чтобы арабские граждане Израиля мобилизовались на спасение мечети Эль-Акса». После пятничной молитвы мусульман на Храмовой горе 29 сентября тысячи арабов стали забрасывать израильских полицейских камнями; начальник полиции Иерусалимского округа Яир Ицхаки был ранен в голову, потерял сознание и был госпитализирован. Силы полиции открыли огонь для разгона демонстрантов; семь человек погибли. После этого беспорядки распространились на отдельные районы Восточного Иерусалима, Бейт-Лехема (Вифлеема), Шхема (Наблуса) и Дженина. При разгоне этих демонстраций 29-30 сентября ещё несколько палестинских арабов были убиты. Image

Пик демонстраций, организованных арабскими гражданами страны, пришелся на 1-2 октября. Около десяти часов утра 1 октября отряд израильской полиции под командованием бригадного комиссара Иегуды Соломона был блокирован в одной из деревень Западной Галилеи. Когда полицейские сочли, что ситуация выходит из-под контроля и угрожает их жизням, они открыли огонь, в результате чего шестьдесят человек получили ранения; погибших в том инциденте не было. Однако в тот же день беспорядки распространились практически на все арабские населенные пункты севера Израиля. Демонстрации в городе Умм-эль-Фахм отличались особым размахом; в них принимал участие и мэр города, руководитель Северного крыла Исламского движения шейх Раад Салах. При разгоне этих демонстраций два человека погибли. В Нацерете демонстранты разгромили местное отделение банка «Ха’поалим» и сети универсальных магазинов «Ха’машбир ле’цархан». Внушительные антиизраильские демонстрации прошли также в Яффо, где арабы забрасывали камнями и бутылками шоссе, связывающее Тель-Авив и его южный пригород Бат-Ям, и на юге страны. Комиссия глав арабских местных советов объявила о всеобщей забастовке в арабском секторе и об объявлении 2 октября днём траура по погибшим в городе Умм-эль-Фахм демонстрантам. Весь следующий день в Умм-эль-Фахме, Кфар-Кане, Кфар-Касеме, Акко, Яффо, Нацерете и других городах продолжались беспорядки, движение на многих транспортных артериях было приостановлено, полностью блокированы въезд в еврейский город Нацрат-Илит и в промышленную зону города Рош-ха’айн. Демонстранты громили светофоры и линии электропередач, забрасывали камнями жилые дома в еврейских населенных пунктах и проезжавшие по шоссе машины. При разгоне этих демонстраций погибли шесть арабских граждан в возрасте от 17 до 25 лет; многие были ранены. Беспорядки и погромы продолжались и 3 октября; в этот день один человек погиб, еще один был ранен и умер день спустя. По всей стране прокатилась волна поджогов лесных массивов. В демонстрациях и акциях протеста приняли участие и друзы, живущие на Голанских высотах, и бедуины, живущие в пустыне Негев, а также палестинцы на контролируемых территориях.

Вечером 3 октября премьер-министр Израиля Эхуд Барак встретился с членами Комиссии глав арабских местных советов и призвал их прекратить беспорядки. Он также пообещал создать независимую комиссию во главе с судьей для расследования действий полиции, повлекших за собой значительные человеческие жертвы среди арабских граждан Израиля. После встречи с Э. Бараком председатель Комиссии Мухаммед Зейдан заявил: «Мы выразили свой протест и заплатили за это тяжелую цену. Сейчас мы хотим вернуться к нормальной жизни». В отдельных местах акции протеста продолжались до 8 октября (в Нацерете от огня полиции погибли еще два человека, в Старом городе в Иерусалиме было атаковано и подожжено отделение полиции), но, как казалось, ситуация внутри «зеленой черты» в целом постепенно вернулась в более или менее приемлемое русло...


Умм-ал-Фахм
Во время беспорядков 1936–39 гг. здесь размещались базы арабских банд, воевавших с англичанами и евреями. В ходе крупной военной операции английской армии в конце 1939 г. банды были уничтожены. В 1948 г. деревня находилась под контролем иракской армии, затем — под властью Иордании и, в соответствии с соглашением о прекращении огня, вошла в состав Израиля.
...
Население Умм-ал-Фахма за 50 лет (1948–1998) увеличилось в десять раз.
...
На муниципальных выборах 1989 г. победу одержало фундаменталистское исламское движение (11 мест из 15 в городском совете). Мэром города также был избран представитель этого движения (за него проголосовало 75% избирателей).

Жители Умм-ал-Фахма приняли активное участие в антиизраильских беспорядках в октябре 2000 г.: в течение нескольких дней были блокированы шоссе Хадера — Афула и прилегающие небольшие еврейские населенные пункты, сожжена бензозаправочная станция, проезжавшие машины и полицейские наряды забрасывали камнями и бутылками с зажигательной смесью...
...
Население — 36,8 тыс. человек (начало 2003 г.), все — мусульмане.
Так и остается загадкой, как удaлoсь М.Карпову сoврaть в 3.3 рaзa бoльше чем Бaрaк...
Помогите Марку с ответом.

igorp
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Re: 27.09.2000 - Так начиналась война Осло

Postby igorp » 25 May 2009, 00:33

В продолжение

От
Договора Бейлин - Абу-Мазен, 1995
до
Кэмп-Дэвида, 2000

[IMRA: Если бы нижеследующие выдержки из интервью Ари Шавита с бывшим министром иностранных дел Шломо Бен-Ами, названного "Конец путешествия" и опубликованого в номере Ха-Арец от 13 сентября 2001 года, были бы взяты из интервью с корпоративным адвокатом, обсуждающим переговоры о сделке, акционеры имели бы все основания привлечь его к суду за сокрытие этой информации и оценок от акционеров во время переговоров.]

Бывший министр иностранных дел Шломо Бен-Ами: "Арафат обманул Израиль - он хочет нас уничтожить"
Выдержки из интервью "Конец путешествия", опубликованного 13 сентября 2001 года в журнальном разделе "Ха-Арец".
Ари Шавит

В: Вы говорите, что за весь период между июнем и январем, в то время как вы отдали долину Иордана и приняли идею обмен территорий и разделения Иерусалима и отдали Храмовую гору - палестинцы пошли Израилю навстречу только в долях процента. То есть все, что они добавили к тому, что они представили Клинтону с самого начала, было 0.34 процента?

O: Мне тяжело с вами спорить. Но это как раз то, что изумляет меня в критике слева. Я просто не понимаю. Да, я и Барак - мы оба были вроде "чужаков" для левых. Мы не были профессиональными миротворцами. Но посмотрите, до чего мы дошли. Скажите, что же еще мы должны были сделать?


Insider Reflects on Failure of 2000 Camp David Summit
(September 13, 2001)

Shlomo Ben-Ami was Israel's top negotiator during the July 2000 Camp David summit. There has been much speculation and analysis about the reasons for the summit's failure. However, first-hand accounts of what went on behind closed doors have been limited. Ben-Ami, who is a history professor and whose performance at Camp David advanced him to the official post of Foreign Minister in Ehud Barak's government, wrote a detailed, day-by-day account of what went on at Camp David. In the following excerpts from an interview he gave in Ha'aretz (September 13, 2001), Ben-Ami reflects on the summit and his subsequent conclusions about Palestinian intentions.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question: Shlomo Ben-Ami, what were the assumptions that guided you and theprime minister, Ehud Barak, when you set out, in the spring of 2000, toterminate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Answer: "We had a number of working assumptions, but I think the mostimportant of them was the basic assumption that has been shared by theAmericans, the Europeans and the Israeli center-left for years: that Oslocreated a rational order in the Middle East based on give-and-take, which inthe future would lead to an acceptable compromise; that in 1993 aquasi-state of the Palestinians was established, in terms of orderlyinternational relations. In retrospect, this turned out to be a mistakenassumption, It turned out that for [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat it wasa huge camouflage net behind which he fomented, and continues to foment,political pressure and terrorism in different dosages in order to underminethe very idea of two states for two nations."

...

Question: Didn't the Palestinians make a counterproposal?

Answer: "No. And that is the heart of the matter. Never, in the negotiations between us and the Palestinians, was there a Palestinian counterproposal. There never was and there never will be. So the Israeli negotiator always finds himself in a dilemma: Either I get up and walk out because these guys aren't ready to put forward proposals of their own, or I make another concession. In the end, even the most moderate negotiator reaches a point where he understands that there is no end to it."

...

Question: Is this the origin of the Camp David formula for a territorial exchange: 9 percent of the territories in return for 1 percent of sovereign Israeli territory?

Answer: "That formulation was never crystallized in a binding document. But from the beginning of the second week at Camp David, it was in the air. It was our working assumption. And it was based on what Arafat had said. Not on some canton scheme of Israel's, but on explicit remarks by Arafat. I remember that on the 17th, I went to Ehud's cabin and I ran into Clinton, who was just coming out of the cabin, and he told me the same: that Arafat's message is readiness for 8 percent with a token territorial swap in the GazaStrip."

...

Question: Still, in the wake of this dynamic, the Camp David conference became the Jerusalem conference. Isn't it the case that you didn't reach a binding territorial agreement, you didn't formulate a solution for the refugee question, all you did was divide Jerusalem?

Answer: "That is not completely accurate. It's true that there was a regression at Camp David on the question of the refugees, but the feeling was that there was flexibility on the territorial issue - that the peace would not stand or fall on this issue. And in the security group, there were very positive discussions that advanced the process. The concept of a multinational force was crystallized. I also do not accept the argument that

we divided the city at Camp David. The decision on the division of Jerusalem came only with the acceptance of Clinton's parameters five months later.

"You have to understand one thing: we at Camp David were moving toward a division in practice but with the aspiration of reaching an agreement that didn't look like a division. The big problem there was that the Palestinians weren't willing to help us with that. They weren't ready for any face-saving formulation for the Israelis. Not on the issue of the Temple Mount, not on sovereignty, not on anything. Arafat did not agree to anything that was nota complete division at Camp David. Therefore, even Bob Malley, whom everyone now likes to quote, told me at some stage that the Palestinians simply want to humiliate us. `They want to humiliate you' were his words." [The reference is to an article by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley - a member of the U.S. peace team and a special assistant to President Clinton - "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," The New York Review of Books, August 9,2001.]

Question: I understand that there was a stage at which Barak astonished everyone by agreeing to divide the Old City of Jerusalem into two quarters under Israeli sovereignty and two quarters under Palestinian sovereignty. Did he do that on his own or was it a joint decision made by the entireIsraeli team?

Answer: "As I told you, I suggested that a special regime be introduced in the Old City. In the wake of that discussion, some time later, the president put forward a two-two proposal, meaning a clear division of sovereignty. In

a conversation with the president, Ehud agreed that that would be a basis for discussion. I remember walking in the fields with Martin Indyk [of the State Department] that night and both of us saying that Ehud was nuts. We didn't understand how he could even have thought of agreeing. Afterward I wrote in my diary that everyone thinks that Amnon [Lipkin-] Shahak and I are pushing Barak to the left, but the truth is that he was the one who pushed us leftward. At that stage - this was the start of the second week of the meeting - he was far more courageous than we were. Truly courageous. Clinton told me a few times: I have never met such a courageous person."

...

Question: So it was over this that Camp David collapsed, the Palestinian rejection of an American proposal on Jerusalem that you found inadequate?

Answer: "No. Camp David collapsed over the fact that they refused to get into the game. They refused to make a counterproposal. No one demanded that they give a positive response to that particular proposal of Clinton's. Contrary to all the nonsense spouted by the knights of the left, there was no ultimatum. What was being asked of the Palestinians was far more elementary: that they put forward, at least once, their own counterproposal. That they not just say all the time `That's not good enough' and wait for us to make more concessions. That's why the president sent [CIA director George] Tenet to Arafat that night - in order to tell him that it would be worth his while to think it over one more time and not give an answer until the morning. But Arafat couldn't take it anymore. He missed the applause of the masses in Gaza."

...

"But when all is said and done, Camp David failed because Arafat refused to put forward proposals of his own and didn't succeed in conveying to us the feeling that at some point his demands would have an end. One of the important things we did at Camp David was to define our vital interests in the most concise way. We didn't expect to meet the Palestinians halfway, and not even two-thirds of the way. But we did expect to meet them at some point. The whole time we waited to see them make some sort of movement in the face of our far-reaching movement. But they didn't. The feeling was that they were constantly trying to drag us into some sort of black hole of more and more concessions without it being at all clear where all the concessions were leading, what the finish line was."

... I remember that at a certain point, I proposed to Arafat that we delay the discussion on Jerusalem for two years. `Not even for two hours,' Arafat said, waving two of his fingers."

...

Question: Are you suggesting that the Intifada was a calculated move by the Palestinians to extricate them from their political and diplomatic hardships?

Answer: "No. I am not attributing that kind of Machiavellian scheme to them. But I remember that when we were at Camp David, Saeb Erekat said that we had until September 13. And I remember that when I visited Mohammed Dahlan and from his office spoke with Marwan Barghouti, he also said that if we didn't reach an agreement by the middle of September, it would not be good. There was a tone of threat in his words that I didn't like. So, when you look at the course of events and see that the violence erupted exactly two weeks after September 13 [the seventh anniversary of the Oslo accords], it makes you think. One thing is certain: the Intifada absolutely saved Arafat."

..."By September we were talking about 7 percent [of the West Bank to be retained by Israel] in return for 2 [percent of sovereign Israeli territory to be transferred to the Palestinians]. I think we also dropped the demand for sovereignty in the Jordan Rift Valley."...

Question: Throughout this whole period, didn't the Palestinians present maps of their own? Was there no Palestinian geographical proposal?

Answer: "They did not present maps at all. Not before Taba. But at Camp david I did chance to see some sort of Palestinian map. It was a map that

reflected a concession of less than 2 percent on their part in return for a territorial swap in a 1:1 ratio. But the territories they wanted from us were not in the Halutza dunes, they wanted them next to the West Bank. I remember that according to their map, Kochav Yair, for example, was supposed to be included in the territory of the Palestinian state; they demanded sovereignty over Kochav Yair."

Question: When the talks resumed in November-December, as the violence raged, but with elections for prime minister in the offing, in what area did they make progress?

Answer: "Mainly on the Jerusalem question. By this stage, we had agreed to the division of the city and to full Palestinian sovereignty on Haramal-Sharif, but we insisted that some sort of attachment of ours to the Temple Mount be recognized. I remember that when we held talks with Yasser Abed Rabbo at Bolling Air Force Base, I raised the following idea without consulting anyone: the Palestinians would have sovereignty on the Temple Mount, but they would undertake not to conduct excavations there because the place was sacred to the Jews. The Palestinians agreed not to excavate, but under no circumstances would they agree to give us the minimal statement,`because the site is sacred to the Jews.'

"What particularly outraged me on that occasion wasn't only the fact that they refused, but the way in which they refused: out of a kind of total contempt, an attitude of dismissiveness and arrogance. At that moment I grasped they are really not Sadat [Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979]. That they were not willing to move toward our position even at the emotional and symbolic level. At the deepest level, they are not ready to recognize that we have any kind of title here."

Question: Three days later, on December 23, 2000, at the end of the Bolling talks, Clinton convened you again and presented his narrow parameters. What were they?

Answer: "Ninety-seven percent: 96 percent of the West Bank [to the palestinians] plus 1 percent of sovereign Israeli territory, or 94 percent of the West Bank plus three percent of sovereign Israeli territory. However, because Clinton also introduced into this formulation the concept of the safe passage route - over which Israeli sovereignty would be ethereal - it could be argued that the Palestinians got almost 100 percent. Clinton constructed his proposal in such a way that if the Palestinians' answer was positive, they would be able to present the solution to their public as a solution of 100 percent."

Question: And Jerusalem?

Answer: "As the reports said: what is Jewish is Israeli, what is Arab is Palestinian. The Temple Mount would be under full Palestinian sovereignty, with Israel getting the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies. But Clinton, in his proposal, did not make reference to the `sacred basin' - the whole area outside the Old City wall that includes the City of David and the Tombs of the Prophets on the road to the Mount of Olives. We demanded that area, in which there are hardly any Arabs, but the Palestinians refused. During the night, there was a very firm phone call between Barak and Clinton on this subject, because we were afraid he would decide against us. As a result of that call, the subject remained open. Clinton did not refer to it."

Question: What about the refugees?

Answer: "Here Clinton tried to square the circle. He went toward the palestinians to the very end of the farthest limit of what we could accept. His formulation was that `the two sides recognize the right of the refugees to return to historic Palestine' or `to return to their homeland,' but on the other hand, he made it clear that `there is no specific right of return to Israel.' We were pleased that he talked about a two-state solution and that the Palestinian state was the homeland of the Palestinian people and israel the home of the Jewish people.

"The mechanism he referred to was more or less that of Stockholm. He obligated a certain absorption of refugees in Israel, but subject to Israel's sovereign laws and its absorption policy."

Question: What about the security arrangements and demilitarization?

Answer: "We insisted that the Palestinian state be demilitarized. The president suggested a softer term: a `non-militarized state.' He also asserted that we would have a significant military presence in the Rift Valley for three years and a symbolic presence at defined sites for three more years. We were given three early-warning stations for a 10-year period with the presence of Palestinian liaison officers."

...

Question: What was the Israeli reaction to Clinton's parameters? Did Barak accept them wholeheartedly?

Answer: ..."The proposal was difficult for us to accept. No one came out dancing andsinging, and Ehud especially was perturbed. At the same time, three days later, the cabinet decided on a positive response to Clinton. All the ministers supported it, with the exception of Matan Vilnai and Ra'anan Cohen. I informed the Americans that Israel's answer was yes."

Question: And the Palestinians?

Answer: "Arafat wasn't in any hurry. He went to Mubarak and then to all kinds of inter-Arab meetings and dragged his feet. He didn't even return Clinton's calls. The whole world, and I mean the whole world, put tremendous pressure on him, but he refused to say yes. During those 10 days there was hardly any international leader who didn't call him - from the Duke of Liechtenstein to the president of China. But Arafat wouldn't be budged. He stuck to his evasive methods. He's like one of those stealth planes. Finally, very late, his staff conveyed to the White House a reply that contained big noes and small yeses. Bruce Reidell, from the National Security Council, told me that we shouldn't get it wrong, that there should be no misunderstandings on our part: Arafat in fact said no."

Question: But didn't Israel also have reservations?

Answer: "Yes. We sent the Americans a document of several pages containing our reservations. But as far as I recall, they were pretty minor and dealt mainly with security arrangements and deployment areas and control over the passages. There was also clarification concerning our sovereignty over the temple Mount. There was no doubt that our reply was positive. In order to remove any doubts, I called Arafat on December 29, at Ehud's instructions, and told him that Israel accepted the parameters and that any further discussion should be only within the framework of the parameters and on how to implement them."

...

Question: Is it the case that Israel would have to uproot about a hundred settlements according to the new map [Israel prepared for meetings in Taba after Camp David]?

Answer: "I don't know the exact number. But we are talking about uprooting many dozens of settlements. In my view, that map also fails to meet the goal we set ourselves and to which Clinton agreed - 80 percent of the settlers in sovereign Israeli territory."

Question: Did the Palestinians accept this map?

Answer: "No. They presented a counter-map that totally eroded the three already shrunken [settlement] blocs and effectively they voided the whole bloc concept of content. According to their map, only a few isolated settlements would remain, which would be dependent on thin strings of narrow access roads. A calculation we made showed that all they agreed to give us was 2.34 percent."

...

Question: Shlomo Ben-Ami, you and Ehud Barak set out on a journey to the bowels of the earth, as it were, to the very heart of the conflict. What did you find?

Answer: "I think that we found a few difficult things. First of all, regarding Arafat, we discovered that he does not have the ability to convey to his Israeli interlocutors that the process of making concessions has an end. His strategy is one of conflict."

Question: Are you saying that he is not a partner?

Answer: "Arafat is the leader of the Palestinians. I cannot change thisfact; it is their disaster. He is so loyal to his truth that he cannotcompromise it. But his truth is the truth of the Islamic ethos, the ethos ofrefugees and victimization. This truth does not allow him to end hisnegotiations with Israel unless Israel breaks its neck. So in thisparticular aspect, Arafat is not a partner. Worse, Arafat is a strategicthreat; he endangers peace in the Middle East and in the world."

Question: So he still does not recognize Israel's right to exist?

Answer: "Arafat's concession vis-a-vis Israel at Oslo was a formalconcession. Morally and conceptually, he didn't recognize Israel's right toexist. He doesn't accept the idea of two states for two peoples. He may beable to make some sort of partial, temporary settlement with us - though Ihave doubts about that, too - but at the deep level, he doesn't accept us.Neither he nor the Palestinian national movement accept us."

Question: Your criticism goes beyond Arafat personally to include also thePalestinian national movement as a whole?

Answer: "Yes. Intellectually, I can understand their logic. I understandthat from their point of view, they ceded 78 percent [of historic Palestine]at Oslo, so the rest is theirs. I understand that from their point of view,the process is one of decolonization, and therefore they are not going tomake a compromise with us, just as the residents of Congo would notcompromise with the Belgians.

"But when all is said and done, after eight months of negotiations, I reachthe conclusion that we are in a confrontation with a national movement inwhich there are serious pathological elements. It is a very sad movement, avery tragic movement, which at its core doesn't have the ability to setitself positive goals.

"At the end of the process, it is impossible not to form the impression thatthe Palestinians don't want a solution as much as they want to place Israelin the dock of the accused. They want to denounce our state more than theywant their own state. At the deepest level they have a negative ethos.This is why unlike Zionism, they are unable to compromise...."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IMRA
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igorp
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Re: 27.09.2000 - Так начиналась война Осло

Postby igorp » 25 May 2009, 00:55

What took place at Camp David in 2000?
The timeline of the 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum called for final status negotiations to be completed by September 13, 2000. Talks during late 1999 and the first half of 2000 led to President Clinton's invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat for a summit at Camp David, Maryland to be convened July 11, 2000.

Barak requested that Clinton call the meeting, feeling that it was important to show that Israel was committed to the Peace Process and that Israel was ready to make the necessary concessions. Barak also felt that the summit was the best place for this, rather than a public exchange of ideas that might be politically hard to constrain. The objective of the summit was to make enough progress on the final status issues so that an agreement could be put together by the September target date.

The meetings were difficult and almost ended prematurely, but President Clinton kept the parties at the negotiating table. The final status issues were the most difficult to resolve: Jerusalem, security, borders and refugees. Sessions lasted late into the nights. Under intense pressure from President Clinton, in an effort to reach a final agreement, and with promises of American support and security guarantees, Prime Minister Barak offered the most substantial concessions and far reaching proposals, going beyond all the long-standing Israeli "red lines", especially as regards Jerusalem. The US team called Barak "courageous" for these offers. When these terms were later revealed in Israel, people were stunned at the extent of the concessions Barak offered and it is unclear whether the Israeli public were prepared to support the deal. However they were never given the opportunity to endorse or reject the proposals; Arafat rejected them out of hand.

The details were not disclosed formally, but according to media reports Barak's offer included:

Israeli redeployment from 95% of the West Bank and 100% of the Gaza Strip
The creation of a Palestinian state in the areas of Israeli withdrawal
The removal of isolated settlements and transfer of the land to Palestinian control
Other Israeli land exchanged for West Bank settlements remaining under Israeli control
Palestinian control over East Jerusalem, including most of the Old City
"Religious Sovereignty" over the Temple Mount, replacing Israeli sovereignty in effect since 1967
In return Arafat had to declare the "end of conflict" and agree that no further claims on Israel could be made in the future. Despite the considerable concessions by Israel, Arafat chose not to negotiate, not to make a counter-offer but to just walk out. This was typical of the Palestinian leader's style: offer nothing, just say no and wait for more concessions. In fact, the Palestinian negotiating team did make concessions during the negotiating process, but Arafat himself never agreed. It was not the specific terms that caused the summit to collapse, but rather the lack of a counterproposal. In addition, Arafat continued to insist on the Palestinian demand for a "right of return" of refugees to Israel, a demand that Israel cannot accept under any peace plan since it would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state.

The summit ended on July 25, without an agreement being reached. At its conclusion, a Trilateral Statement was issued defining the agreed principles to guide future negotiations. An optimistic summary of the event would be that difficult issues were attacked for the first time and progress was made. But, what really happened at Camp David is that Barak offered astounding compromises in an effort to close a deal while Arafat stuck to the traditional Palestinian positions. The Israelis and Palestinians both lost faith in the process: if there is no deal in this favorable environment, when could there be?

After the close of the meeting, Barak said:

Israel was ready to reach agreement at a painful price but not at any price.
Arafat made no major statement before leaving the United States, because anything he would say would force him to disagree with Clinton’s assessment that Arafat was at fault for the summit's failure. In the following weeks, the Palestinians, having lost patience with the diplomatic approach, launched the al-Aqsa intifada (September 2000).

During the fall of 2000, with the al-Aqsa intifada raging, there were several more attempts to follow-up on the Camp David negotiations, in Washington and Taba, Egypt in January 2001. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met again in Washington, but there was no progress for the same reason: Arafat and his team said no to the US-brokered Israeli proposals and had no proposals of their own to offer.

President Clinton, and others who participated, put the blame for the failure of hte talks squarely on Arafat and the Palestinian negotiators. In 2001, Clinton told guests at a party at the Manhattan apartment of former UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke that Arafat called to bid him farewell three days before he left office. "You are a great man," Arafat said. "The hell I am," Clinton said he responded. "I'm a colossal failure, and you made me one."

Sources and additional reading on this topic:
Arafat didn't negotiate - he just kept saying no
The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David
Peace Talks Continue
Interview of President Clinton by Israeli Television
Have the Palestinians Abandoned a Negotiated Settlement?
Camp David: What Went Wrong and What Lies Ahead?
Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David
Peace Talks Continue
Camp David 2000
The 2000 Camp David Summit
Former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami reveals: Arafat tricked Israel - wants to break us
Clinton to Arafat: It’s All Your Fault
Dennis Ross comments on Camp David and Taba


Dennis Ross comments
Listen to what Dennis Ross said. He was there at Camp David and Taba.

Monday, April 22, 2002 Dennis Ross: Arafat rejected deal that would give the Palestinians 97% of West Bank and 3 percent of Israel.

Following is a transcript excerpt from Fox News Sunday, April 21, 2002.

BRIT HUME, FOX NEWS: Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has worked to achieve Middle East peace throughout President Clinton's final days in office. In the months following Clinton's failed peace summit at Camp David, U.S. negotiators continued behind-the-scenes peace talks with the Palestinians and Israelis up until January 2001, and that followed Clinton's presentation of ideas at the end of December 2000.

ROSS: The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they
basically said the following: On borders, 97 percent of the West Bank would go to the Palestinians. There would be about a 3 percent annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 3 percent swap of Israeli land to the Palestinians. So there would be a net of 100 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.

On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.
On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation or to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.

And when it came to security, there would be a international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley.
These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what each side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.

FRED BARNES, WEEKLY STANDARD: Now, Palestinian officials say to this day
that Arafat said yes.
ROSS: Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with the president, and I was there in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give.
HUME: What was he supposed to give?

ROSS: He supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that.
HUME: He rejected their being able to have that?
ROSS: He rejected that. Yes! He kept telling us, that the Jews had no history in Jerusalem and that the Wailing Wall was really the Baraq Wall and was Arab.

He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-existent.

He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace.
You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in
over the West Bank because you can't -- there's no space through otherwise.
He rejected that.
So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected.

HUME: Now, let's take a look at the map. Now, this is what -- how the Israelis had created a map based on the president's ideas. And...
ROSS: Right.
HUME: ... what can we -- that situation shows that the territory at least is contiguous. What about Gaza on that map?
ROSS: The Israelis would have gotten completely out of Gaza.
ROSS: And what you see also in this line, they show an area of temporary Israeli control along the border.
HUME: Right.
ROSS: Now, that was an Israeli desire. That was not what we presented. But we presented something that did point out that it would take six years before the Israelis would be totally out of the Jordan Valley.

So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow green space along the border, would become part of the orange. So the Palestinians would have in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons, completely untrue. It was contiguous.

HUME: Cantons being ghettos, in effect...
ROSS: Right.
HUME: ... that would be cut off from other parts of the Palestinian state.
ROSS: Completely untrue.
And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have been an elevated highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure that there would be not just safe passage for the Palestinians, but free passage.

BARNES: I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians point out that this was never put on paper, this offer. Why not?
ROSS: We presented this to them so that they could record it. When the president presented it, he went over it at dictation speed. He then left the cabinet room. I stayed behind. I sat with them to be sure, and checked to be sure that every single word.

The reason we did it this way was to be sure they had it and they could record it. But we told the Palestinians and Israelis, if you cannot accept these ideas, this is the culmination of the effort, we withdraw them. We did not want to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what we said. You don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this is the end of it, we withdraw it.
So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this day, the Palestinians have not presented to their own people what was available.
BARNES: In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for further negotiations so he'd get more?
ROSS: Well, exactly.

HUME: Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to your account.
ROSS: We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to be sure it couldn't be a floor for negotiations.
HUME: Right.
ROSS: It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof.
HUME: This was a final offer?
ROSS: Exactly. Exactly right.
HUME: This was the solution.

HUME: Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of talks here sort of fell apart or ended or broke down or whatever because of the intervention of the Israeli elections. What about that?
ROSS: The real issue you have to understand was not the Israeli elections.
It was the end of the Clinton administration. The reason we would come with what was a culminating offer was because we were out of time.
They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were governed by the fact that the Clinton administration was going to end, and both sides said we understand this is the point of decision.

HUME: What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no?
ROSS: Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.

Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door.
For him to end the conflict is to end himself. I also believe, Arafat was never serious about making a peace deal at Camp David. Whenever Arafat gets in trouble with his own people, to divert attention to this, he always incites them against Israel. This is a common tactic among dictators. Arafat knew, he couldn't do this no more, if he agreed to peace.

HUME: Might it not also have been true, though, Dennis, that, because the intifada had already begun -- so you had the Camp David offer rejected, the violence begins anew, a new offer from the Clinton administration comes along, the Israelis agree to it, Barak agrees to it...
ROSS: Yes.

HUME: ... Might he not have concluded that the violence was working?
ROSS: It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and maybe the rest of the world. Arafat wanted to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and started this horrific war.
HUME: Dennis Ross, thank you so much.
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